Designing the design phase of critical care devices: a cognitive approach  by Malhotra, Sameer et al.
www.elsevier.com/locate/yjbin
Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 34–50Designing the design phase of critical care devices:
a cognitive approach
Sameer Malhotraa,*, Archana Laxmisana, Alla Keselmana, Jiajie Zhangb, Vimla L. Patela
a Laboratory of Decision Making and Cognition, Department of Biomedical Informatics, Columbia University, NY 10032, USA
b School of Health Information Sciences, University of Texas Health Sciences Center at Houston, USA
Received 13 October 2004
Available online 2 December 2004Abstract
In this study, we show how medical devices used for patient care can be made safer if various cognitive factors involved in patient
management are taken into consideration during the design phase. The objective of this paper is to describe a methodology for
obtaining insights into patient safety features—derived from investigations of institutional decision making—that could be incor-
porated into medical devices by their designers. The design cycle of a product, be it a medical device, software, or any kind of equip-
ment, is similar in concept, and course. Through a series of steps we obtained information related to medical errors and patient
safety. These were then utilized to customize the generic device design cycle in ways that would improve the production of critical
care devices. First, we provided individuals with diﬀerent levels of expertise in the clinical, administrative, and engineering domains
of a large hospital setting with hypothetical clinical scenarios, each of which described a medical error event involving health pro-
fessionals and medical devices. Then, we asked our subjects to ‘‘think-aloud’’ as they read through each scenario. Using a set of
questions as probes, we then asked our subjects to identify key errors and attribute them to various players. We recorded and tran-
scribed the responses and conducted a cognitive task analysis of each scenario to identify diﬀerent entities as ‘‘constant,’’ ‘‘partially
modiﬁable,’’ or ‘‘modiﬁable.’’ We compared our subjects responses to the results of the task analysis and then mapped them to the
modiﬁable entities. Lastly, we coded the relationships of these entities to the errors in medical devices. We propose that the incor-
poration of these modiﬁable entities into the device design cycle could improve the device end product for better patient safety
management.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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that printed it!’’—Anonymous.
Even if the above statement were true, when the ques-
tion of errors in clinical settings arises, assigning the
blame does not help solve the problem. The individual
with closest proximity (the operator) to the device most
often bears the brunt of blame [1]. The critical care set-1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2004.11.001
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E-mail address: sam7007@dbmi.columbia.edu (S. Malhotra).ting is a high-tension environment with a large number
of users interacting with an even larger number of de-
vices. Errors related to devices or users in the healthcare
setup are drawing increased attention towards them as
their recognition and reporting has improved [2,3]. We
need to analyze these errors to devise measures that will
help prevent them in future.
The use of devices in medical care was introduced for
many reasons, the primary ones being related patient
monitoring and automation of procedures in order to
save time and increase accuracy. The devices were not
intended to replace human caregivers but to supplement
their tasks. The eﬀectiveness of these devices relied
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of including patient safety measures in medical devices
slowly evolved as the impact of errors due to the impro-
per design, implementation, and use, of medical devices
started being recognized. In addition to introducing
medical errors, the newly acquired devices raised other
issues, including the disruption of organizational culture
and concern among physicians regarding the changes in
their professional relationships and established work-
ﬂow routines [4].
1.1. Evolution of the medical device safety net
From a general standpoint, when a new device is in-
vented, the primary concern at the time is to achieve the
desired functionality. With constant use, shortcomings
or possible improvements for the device become evident;
with modiﬁcations, subsequent generations of the device
evolve into much better contraptions. Similarly medical
devices and instruments have evolved in functionality by
incorporation of more and more features and automa-
ticity. With development of more programmable and
independently operating devices, it became imperativeFig. 1. Evolution of the device safety net. (A) Stage one: medical devices with
safety features limited to the device. Features such as inbuilt alerts and a
patient safety features. Features that take into account the setting of operatio
Patient safety administered by the device extended to the interactions betwethat they not compromise patient safety in any way.
Fig. 1 illustrates the ‘‘Evolution of the Patient Safety
Net,’’ delineating how diﬀerent generations of medical
devices evolved to provide safety along with their in-
tended functionality.
The ﬁrst generation of medical devices was patient
safety naı¨ve because their primary aim was to achieve
a certain functionality. The need for safety features
was unrecognized until a medical error or error in the
making was observed. The earliest safety features in-
cluded alarms, constraints, input conﬁrmations and
reconﬁrmations, but their scope was limited to the
immediate domain of device interface and operation.
Considering the fact that medical devices do not work
in isolation, but interact with various other entities and
personnel working in the same setting, the next evolu-
tionary stage in terms of patient safety measures should
account for these factors as well. From the time a clini-
cian decides a plan of action to the actual execution of
this plan, a number of cognitive processes and sequential
events occur. The communication cascade triggered by
this situation is mostly concentrated around nurses
and physicians [5]. Performing a cognitive task analysisno patient safety features. (B) Stage two: medical devices with patient
larms were included. (C) Stage three: medical devices with extended
n and the involved workﬂow as well as the boundaries of human errors.
en the various role players and their usage of medical devices.
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ties of the health care system can provide cues for new
design principles in device development.
1.2. Collaborative decision making, devices, and errors
The Intensive Care Unit (ICU) is a unique and dy-
namic setting where multiple individuals are involved
in the common process of providing both physical as
well as emotional care and support to critically ill pa-
tients. From afar (or to an outsider), the workﬂow situ-
ation is diﬃcult to keep track oﬀ and, to some extent,
may seem very disorganized, especially with all the buzz-
ing alarms and the ﬂashing display screens of medical
equipment adding to the confusion. The high-risk pa-
tients admitted to the ICU have a number of medical
complications that require rigorous monitoring, inter-
ventions, and an array of medications to stabilize them.
Consulting physicians, attending physicians, residents
and nurses are all involved in patient care decision mak-
ing, each of them possessing specialized and sometimes
overlapping knowledge [6]. In the face of the apparent
chaos the team works together in a coordinated way
and relies on various sources of information to carry
out its tasks [7]. In addition, sophisticated patient care
technology is omnipresent in contemporary health care
assisting health care providers with monitoring and
treating the patient. The use of such technology, how-
ever, also causes an additional cognitive load for its
users in terms of device operation, and this at times
can disturb the delicate equilibrium of the collaborative
decision-making process. This gives us many reasons for
refuting the traditional approach of blaming the clini-
cian or the nurse alone for medical errors and for view-
ing medical errors as a complex interplay of many
individual, organizational, situational, and technologi-
cal factors [8].2. Background and theoretical framework
The last 100 years have seen the most dramatic suc-
cesses in the ﬁeld of medicine. From the discovery of
Ehrlichs magic bullets for treating infections to the gen-
esis of highly techno-centric equipment for diagnosis
and treatment, the improved longevity of human life
could possibly be the single most important outcome.
But when the same equipment becomes responsible for
major or even minor compromises in patient health, it
becomes a matter of grave concern. The medical error
body of research emerged in the early 1990s, with land-
mark studies conducted by Lucian Leape and David
Bates [9,10] and supported by the Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research, now the Agency for Health-
care Research and Quality (AHRQ) [11]. Their work in-
volved the identiﬁcation and evaluation of systemfailures that underlie adverse drug events and poten-
tially adverse drug events. The most common defects
were found in systems meant for disseminating drug
knowledge and for timely access to patient records.
They concluded that changes made to the systems to im-
prove the dissemination and display of drug and patient
data would make drug-related errors less likely [12,13].
But the problem of medical errors still did not get the
amount of attention that it deserved. Then, in Novem-
ber 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report titled
To Err Is Human: Building A Safer Health System was
released, focusing a great deal of attention on the issue
of medical errors and patient safety [14]. Two large stud-
ies, one conducted in Colorado and Utah and the other
in New York, found that adverse events occurred in 2.9
and 3.7% of hospitalizations, respectively. When extrap-
olated to the approximate 33.6 million admissions to US
hospitals in 1997, the results of the study in Colorado
and Utah implied that at least 44,000 Americans die
each year as a result of medical errors. The combined
goal of the recommendations was to create suﬃcient
pressure in the external environment to make errors
costly to health care organizations and providers, so
that they would be compelled to take action to improve
patient safety. It also emphasized the need to enhance
knowledge and tools that improve patient safety and
break down legal and cultural barriers that would im-
pede improvements in safety. The impact following the
article was extraordinary, and researchers began to
study the nature of errors related to human, device,
environmental, and socio-cultural factors in a detailed
manner.
In this study, we show how medical devices used for
patient care can be made safer if various cognitive fac-
tors involved in patient management are taken into con-
sideration during the design phase. Medical device
design is similar to the manufacture of any other prod-
uct in that understanding the requirements and expecta-
tions of the stakeholders is the ﬁrst step. This knowledge
is then utilized for building a prototype, which is then
subjected to a series of evaluations and testing cycles.
The feedback from these evaluations is used for modiﬁ-
cations and improvement, giving rise to the ﬁnal prod-
uct [15,16]. But ‘‘ﬁnal’’ is misleading because the
product continues to change as diﬀerent versions of it
are released over time, each one being an improvement
over its predecessor.
A concept proposed by Patrick D. Fleck, president of
Cooper Interaction Design [17] illustrates an interesting
aspect of decision making in the product development
cycle (not speciﬁcally for medical devices). A decision-
making model for innovative product design called the
OODA loop was described (see Fig. 2), its four main
steps being observation, orientation, decision, and
action. The gist of the model is that if one cannot make
clear observations and form viable options, then the
Fig. 2. Decision-making model for innovative product design, OODA loop.
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eﬀectively crumbles.
Applying the model to the domain of medical device
engineering, we can appreciate that in a medical setting
the variables are far too many. The operation of a device
depends on a complex network of communication
among many role players, each with diﬀering cognitive,
and executive capabilities. Also, other factors of the
health care setting which are apparently unrelated to
the focus of the product (e.g., administration, policies),
aﬀect its functioning in multiple ways.
The current status of medical device engineering is
that during the design phase it follows almost the same
rules as those for other manufactured products. The dif-
ference lies in the rigorous testing and evaluation that is
performed before a medical device is made available in
the market. This is necessary because these devices are
directly or indirectly related to the health and life of a
patient. To satisfy regulatory issues, most biomedical
systems must have documentation to show that they
were managed, designed, built, tested, delivered, and
used according to a planned, approved process [18]. In
the US, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
adopts an adversarial position. It actively regulates indi-
vidual devices and drugs, assuming that new therapies
and products are unsafe and do not work until proven
otherwise. This process is not considered completely fail
proof in preventing the release of unsafe therapies and
products, but can easily create a bottleneck in the devel-
opment process.
The health eﬀects of this bottleneck have been quan-
tiﬁed by comparing approval times in the US to ap-
proval times in Europe. The approval of biotech drugs
in Europe outpaces those in the US primarily because
of diﬀerent hierarchical and policy issues, although it
is diﬃcult to measure the eﬀect on quality control [19].
Despite our stringent measures, we do ﬁnd faulty andpotentially hazardous medical devices installed in health
care institutions in the US. To curb such occurrences,
initiative needs to be taken to focus on the device design
phase and to bring human and other situational factors
that are unique to health care into consideration from
the very beginning.
FDA data collected between 1985 and 1989 demon-
strated that 45–50% of all device recalls stemmed from
poor product design. Furthermore, the FDA recognizes
that a poorly designed user interface can induce errors
and operating ineﬃciencies even when operated by a
well-trained, competent user [20,21]. Poor device design
also leads to great economic waste as studies have
shown that making changes to device design after ship-
ping is about 40 times more expensive than when per-
formed at the prototype development stage [22]. This
research discusses the methodology used to acquire
insight into these factors and their subsequent link to
device design.
Cognitive science has played an increasingly impor-
tant role in researching the above mentioned factors
since its methods and theories illuminate diﬀerent facets
of the design and implementation of information. It
provides important insight into the nature of cognitive
processes involved in human–computer interaction and
thereby improves the application of medical informa-
tion systems by addressing the knowledge, memory,
and strategies used in a variety of cognitive activities
[23]. It also plays a role in characterizing and enhancing
human performance by the formalized study of human–
computer (or device) interaction using such methods as
cognitive walkthroughs, task analyzes, and heuristic
evaluations [24,26]. The purpose of a cognitive walk-
through is to evaluate the cognitive processes of users
performing a task. The method involves identifying
the goals and the sequences of action required to
accomplish a given task. The method is intended to
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the successful completion of a task [27]. A cognitive task
analysis is concerned with characterizing the decision-
making and reasoning skills and the information-pro-
cessing needs of subjects as they perform activities and
tasks that require processing complex information
[28,29]. Such analyzes have also been applied to the
design of systems to create a better understanding of
human information needs in their development [23,
29–33].
Heuristic evaluation is a usability inspection method
that has been found to be a useful tool for medical de-
vice evaluation [25]. It refers to a class of techniques in
which the evaluators examine the interface of a device
for usability issues. They walk through the interface
and identify elements that violate usability heuristics.
It can be applied to paper or electronic mock-ups or
prototypes as well as to completely implemented de-
signs. There are a few limitations to this technique:
one is that it focuses on a single device or application
and therefore may not identify problems that arise be-
cause of the environment in which the device is to be
used; another is that it does not indicate elements of
the interface that correctly follow usability guidelines;
nor does it reveal any major missing functionality.
The immediate environment of the device is the indi-
vidual interacting with it. HCI is a special and important
area of study. Human factors engineering is a discipline
that seeks to design devices, software, and systems to
meet the needs, capabilities, and limitations of the users,
rather than expecting the users to adapt to the design. A
complete human factors engineering analysis for medi-
cal devices or software systems includes four major com-
ponents: user, function, task, and representational
analyzes [34].
In conclusion, the importance of cognitive science
methods in patient safety research especially in examin-
ing how cognitive factors aﬀect performance and how
informatics methods can identify sources of errors and
provide interventions to reduce them [35] needs to be
considered. It is time to recognize that cognitive factors
are especially important in understanding and promot-
ing safe practices.3. Methods
3.1. Participants
We selected a total of nine subjects for the study,
including an anesthesiology and critical care specialist,
two nurses, a physicians assistant, an anesthesiology
resident, two biomedical engineers, and two administra-
tors. We wanted the subjects to be representative of the
range of professional groups that deal with device-
related issues during device selection and purchase,use, and maintenance. We identiﬁed these groups on
the basis of a previous study of the decision-making pro-
cess in infusion pump selection, conducted by our re-
search team (Keselman et al. [36]), which also included
administrators, biomedical engineers, nurses, and physi-
cians. The nine subjects chosen for this study had clini-
cal, engineering, or administrative responsibilities and
were representative of the people responsible for making
decisions about device use, maintenance and selection in
a hospital. The subjects had varying levels of expertise
and came from diﬀerent educational backgrounds as
is generally found in a typical large-scale health
institution.
3.2. Materials
3.2.1. Scenarios
The materials used in the study included three sce-
narios, each describing medical errors that involved
medical devices. Our goal in designing the scenarios
was to create hypothetical situations based on realistic
events and frequently used devices with relatively com-
plex user-interfaces. We also wanted the scenarios to
represent a variety of hospital settings and a represen-
tative range of medical professionals interacting with
devices (as possible sources of human error). The sce-
narios were developed on the basis of examples from
the FDAs medical device report ﬁles [18]. A clinical
consultant assisted in the evaluation of the appropri-
ateness of the scenarios with respect to the projects
objectives.
A brief synopsis of each of the three scenarios is given
below. The complete scenarios have been described in
Appendix A. The devices and the people potentially con-
stituting the human component of error are listed in
parentheses.
1. Scenario 1 (nitroglycerine, infusion pump, and
nurse). A nurse is receiving multiple orders for multi-
ple patients at the same time in a busy and stressful
emergency room setting. For one particular patient
she receives four drug orders in one measuring unit,
and the ﬁfth order for nitroglycerine infusion in
another unit of dosage. She ends up programming
the nitroglycerine infusion pump with a dosage in
units similar to the other four orders. The patient gets
overdosed and experiences a dangerous fall in blood
pressure, but is rescued when the critical care team
discovers this.
2. Scenario 2 (oxygen, ventilator, and physician). In a
pediatric ICU setting, a patient is receiving oxygen
through a ventilator. A resident comes and changes
the ﬂow rate from one to one point ﬁve. He is una-
ware of the fact that the device can only be put on
discrete settings of one, two, three, etc. and does
not operate when the dial is between these numbers.
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error is discovered and the child is given higher ﬂow
rates and rescued.
3. Scenario 3 (heparin, infusion pump, and physician).
A patient is receiving intravenous heparin via an infu-
sion pump. A resident changes the dose delivered to a
higher rate and then is required to change it back to
the maintenance dose. In doing so he overlooks the
conﬁrm button for the dose change to maintenance
and the patient continues to receive the high dosage.
The pump does keep beeping as an indicator but the
patients family members are the only ones to notice it
and do not take any action. The nurse only discovers
the error the next morning.
3.2.2. Semi-structured interview
A set of ﬁve questions was designed to elicit a think-
aloud protocol in response to each scenario. The ques-
tions were designed with the purpose of eliciting subjects
assessment of the source and seriousness of the error,
without prompting them to place blame on a speciﬁc indi-
vidual. Response-speciﬁc probes and clariﬁcations fol-
lowed each of the ﬁve key questions. The key questions
and the rationale for each are given below.
Q1. Please provide a summary of the scenario (without
looking at it).
[To assess the accuracy of the subjects problem
representation.]
Q2. What were the causes for the error in the
scenario?
[To assess the subjects perception of the source of
errors, without prompting identiﬁcation of the
human component.]
Q3. Please rank these causes on a scale from most seri-
ous to the least serious.
[To assess the subjects perception of the relative
seriousness of various causes.]
Q4. Who do you think was responsible for these
errors?
[To assess the subjects perception of the human
component (and attribution) of the errors.]
Q5. What steps could be taken to prevent these errors?
[To assess perception of potential safeguards and
their locations.]4. Procedure
We provided the subjects with the scenarios (one by
one) and asked each to answer a set of ﬁve questions.
The questions were aimed at eliciting a think-aloud pro-
tocol in a semi-structured fashion. The interviews were
recorded and later transcribed. The transcripts werethen parsed into idea segments. Each segment consisted
of one stated cause of the error and the explanation for
that cause. A segment varied in length and could include
a sentence clause, a sentence, or in some cases the main
sentence and one or two supporting sentences.
The interview data were then analyzed using a hierar-
chical scheme of thematic codes (e.g., [37]). Some of the
codes were top-level categories, others were lower-level
codes subsumed by the top-level codes. The develop-
ment of the coding scheme involved a combination of
top–down and bottom–up approaches. Thematic coding
that is partly based on categories that are not prede-
ﬁned, but emerge in the course of data analysis, falls into
the theoretical framework of the grounded theory ap-
proach to data analysis (e.g., [38]).
Grounded theory is ‘‘theory that was derived from
data, systematically gathered and analyzed through re-
search process.’’ This approach assumes a close relation-
ship among the data, the analysis, and the theory that
emerges from the data. The researcher sets out to conduct
an investigation with a minimal amount of preconceived
hypotheses, allowing the data to tell the story from the
participants perspective. The focus is on collecting rich
descriptive data that cannot be easily subjected to statis-
tical analysis. This research approach is appropriate for
investigating complex topics in their naturalistic con-
texts. It is concerned with ‘‘understanding behavior from
the subjects own frame of reference’’ (Bogdan and Biklen
[39]). Given that medical care is a complex collaborative
process, with medical errors closely tied to the settings in
which they occur, we felt that situating our work in the
grounded theory approach would help us do justice to
the nature of the process we set out to study. The combi-
nation of theory-driven and data-driven approaches of-
fered the advantage of being attuned to the richness of
naturalistic qualitative data, while still relying on a preli-
minary framework for maintaining objectivity.
We developed several coding categories based on the
study objectives and the responses to interview questions
(e.g., error involved, individual responsible, and severity
of the error) and using the methodological approach of
grounded theory (Corbin and Strauss). Other categories
emerged from the empirical review of the data. A group
of three investigators reviewed a subset of protocols, cre-
ating coding categories until reaching saturation (i.e., the
point at which no new categories emerged). At that
point, coding categories were grouped and organized in
a hierarchical fashion. These categories included error
involved, individual responsible, severity of the error,
modiﬁability of the error, suggested solution to the error,
and the errors relationship to the device. Finally, three
coders jointly conducted two iterations of data coding,
assigning codes to segments and resolving disagreements
through discussion. The ﬁnal top- and lower-level cate-
gories are discussed in the results section and the related
(Tables 1–9) can be found in Appendix A.
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Studies in the HCI ﬁeld are essentially composed of
two elements: Individuals and Machines. We chose to di-
vide our study into two sections and analyze the com-
posite HCI entity from the Individuals and Devices
perspective. The Individuals perspective focuses on
health care professionals in the critical care setting and
how their perceptions and interpretations of an error
diﬀer as a function of expertise. This aspect of the study
is described in detail elsewhere (Laxmisan et al., 2004),
but in summary the results show diﬀerences in error per-
ception as a function of expertise as well as the nature of
the task performed by the individual [40]. Errors per-
taining to the critical events of scenarios were identiﬁed
such that they fell under or were related to the area of
expertise of the individual (e.g., A biomedical engineer
performed a much better identiﬁcation of device related
errors that were not picked up by the administrators). In
research along similar lines, Chung et al. [41] developed
a methodology for predicting human error during oper-
ation of a medical device by using techniques to evaluate
the interface and identify potential error-inducing fea-
tures and steps.
This paper addresses the Devices perspective. The er-
ror categories that were derived from the transcripts of
each subject for each of the scenarios were further qual-
iﬁed based on modiﬁability and relation to medical de-
vice (discussed later in Sections 5.2 and 5.3). The error
categories were also ascribed a set of the following vari-
ables: broad error category, individual implicated, mod-
iﬁability of the error, and relationship of error to the
medical device. Those categories in which the values
for all four of these variables were unique were pooled
together and treated as the ﬁnal set. This set was then
used for deriving guidelines for the device design phase.
5.1. Coding scheme development
At the end of multiple rounds of coding, a total of 54
unique error categories was identiﬁed (see Appendix A).
These were then further assorted into six broad catego-
ries. In cases of overlap where a single error category
seemed to belong to more than one broad category,
the assignment was made by reviewing the context of
the error in the related transcript segment. The six cate-
gories are given below.
 Administration-related categories. Factors responsible
for the error that deal with the training and education
of staﬀ, device in-servicing policies, device purchas-
ing, and device retirement (ﬁve subcategories came
under this category).
 Device-related categories. Those errors in which the
medical device used in the scenario was held directly
responsible for the mishap were considered to bedevice related. Poor user interfaces, faulty design,
and lack of inbuilt logic are examples of categories
that fall under this heading (15 subcategories came
under this category).
 Situation-related categories. Situational factors and
surroundings that at the given time were hostile or
indiﬀerent to the workﬂow and users involved. (Only
one subcategory—environmental stress/task over-
load—was present).
 Policy-related categories. Errors occurring due to bad
protocol, lack of standards, and vague workﬂow poli-
cies are included in this category. One example of this
category are order format errors, which are due to lack
of standards for units, mode (verbal vs. written), or
execution steps (15 sub-categories were policy related).
 User error.When the individual identiﬁed in the error
setting is responsible for the error. User errors have
speciﬁc categories denoting carelessness, oversight,
lack of knowledge, etc (15 sub-categories were indi-
vidual/user related).
 Setup-related categories. This category includes errors
caused by the ﬂoor setting or geographical organiza-
tion of devices, patients, and interface/alarms (Three
sub-categories were related to the setup of the critical
care environment).
5.2. Category division based on modiﬁability
When the error in question was amenable to modiﬁ-
cation and potential avoidance, we added an attribute of
modiﬁability based on the following deﬁnitions:
 Modiﬁability.Yes (complete)—Indicates that the error
category/task in question has a narrower domain, has
no or partial human dependent interaction and is ame-
nable to modiﬁcation. The deﬁnition entails discrete-
ness in terms of modiﬁability and does not imply
perfection. Device-related errors mainly fall in this
category because a modiﬁcation made to a device is a
discrete change, one that may not counter the error.
Example. Error subcategory. Device design ﬂaw poor
visual interface is a totally machine-dependent entity
and can be modiﬁed by the designers.
 Modiﬁability. No—indicates that the error category/
task in question is of a broader domain or is beyond
human control and modiﬁability.
Example. Error subcategory. Environmental stress/
task overload is something that is not modiﬁable. Ser-
vice cannot be denied in emergency health care settings
even if things are stressful for the health care providers.
Such situations are not modiﬁable and are of a very
unpredictable nature.
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gory/task in question has signiﬁcant human depen-
dence, which makes the potential modiﬁcation for
improvement dependent on the user in a certain
way. Also includes factors that have a partial situa-
tional or environmental component which is beyond
modiﬁcation.
Example. Error subcategory. User error—Order inter-
pretation is partially modiﬁable. Implementing standard-
ized formats for order dispensing smoothes out the
process, but there will always be a human element in the
situation. Despite the modiﬁed standard format, the per-
son receiving the order may still interpret it wrongly.
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the error categories
with respect to modiﬁability. Of the total (54) error cat-
egories, thirty-one were modiﬁable (57.4%). The largest
completely modiﬁable error category pertained to the
medical device-related errors (14). This was followed
by policy and protocol. The largest partially modiﬁable
error category was the user related-error category (14).
This was again expected based on our deﬁnition for par-
tially modiﬁable errors; it also shows that a signiﬁcant
portion of errors is attributed to humans (27.7%).
5.3. Category division based on relation of the error to
the medical device
All three scenarios involved complex interactions be-
tween the healthcare providers and the medical device in
the setting. Once the transcripts were coded, the extent
of their relation to the medical device was then based
on the following deﬁnitions:
 Direct relationship:Yes—If the error takes place at the
level of or directly upon the device during its operation.Fig. 3. The six error categories subdivided into modiﬁable (Yes), partially mo
frequency of error categories according to their modiﬁability characteristics.Example. Device design—Bad visual display.
 Direct relationship. No—If the error in question was
totally unrelated to the presence of the medical
device.
Example. User error—Lack of knowledge. A dis-
crepancy in the users clinical knowledge that contrib-
utes to the medical error has no bearing on the
medical device.
 Direct relationship: Partial—An error that is
located outside of the device domain but directly
aﬀects operation of the device. This deﬁnition
encompasses all error categories that fall between
the directly device related and device unrelated
categories.
Example. User error—Mislabeling of the infusion
pump. The nurse committed the error but because it
was done on the device it is classiﬁed as partially related
to it. Such errors give possible insights on how improve-
ments can be made to the device to prevent the user
from making a similar error in the future. In this case,
a future improvement could be conceived in terms of
the device giving labeling options or prompts for
rechecking the label (see Fig. 4).
The purpose of adding the device relationship attri-
bute was to demonstrate how the medical device is the
nucleus surrounded by all other entities and their re-
lated errors. The errors of these entities may have
complete, little, or no linkage/relationship to the med-
ical device. This view gives perspective on what poten-
tial error domains and cognitive factors outside of the
device can be inﬂuenced and therefore taken into
account by its design; viz. an extension to its safety
net.diﬁable (Partial) and Non-modiﬁable (No) errors. The graph shows the
Fig. 4. The six error categories and the mapping of their relation to the medical device in the scenario. Directly related (Yes), partially related
(Partial) and unrelated (No) were used for mapping. The graph shows the frequency of the error categories based on their relation to the device.
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The error categories identiﬁed by the subjects in the
three scenarios that are based on: (1) the nitroglycerine
infusion pump; (2) the oxygen ventilator machine; and
(3) the heparin infusion pump are as follows:
Scenario 1. Nurse programming an infusion pump for
nitroglycerinedelivery inhigh-tension critical care setting.
Fig. 5 shows the workﬂow and events occurring in
Scenario 1, where the nitroglycerine infusion pumpFig. 5. Diagrammatic representation of the task and communication ﬂow o
pump in a high-tension critical care setting.was the medical device involved. Verbal orders for ﬁve
medications were given to the nurse. One of the ﬁve or-
ders diﬀered in the medication units. The overworked
nurse, who was attending to other patients at the same
time, programmed the pump for the patient with the
medication doses mentioned by the doctor but with
all ﬁve doses in the same units. Nitroglycerine was
the medication that was consequently transfused to
the patient in the wrong amounts. The pump did not
have the internal logic necessary to recognize the over-f Scenario 1 which involved programming of a nitroglycerine infusion
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non-standard unit (assuming there are such standards).
The overdose of nitroglycerine caused a dangerous fall
in the patients blood pressure. Luckily the error was
recognized and the patient was saved from permanent
harm.
Of the total 54 error categories identiﬁed, 26 came
from this scenario.
 Modiﬁable error categories. Out of the total 26 error
categories 11 (42.3%) were identiﬁed as modiﬁable.
Out of these 11 modiﬁable error categories eight were
considered to be in direct relation to the device and
three were partially/indirectly related.
 Partially modiﬁable error categories. Out of the total
26 error categories 14 (53.8%) were identiﬁed as par-
tially modiﬁable. Out of these 14 partially modiﬁable
error categories two were directly related to the
device, eight were considered to be partially/indirectly
related, and four were considered to have no relation
to the medical device.
 Non-modiﬁable error categories. Environmental stress
and task overload were considered to be non-modiﬁ-
able entities with no direct relation to the medical
device, and it appeared once (3.9%)
Scenario 2: A physician alters oxygen ﬂow through
the ventilator in a pediatric critical care setting.
 Modiﬁable error categories. Out of the total 16 error
categories 11 (68.75%) were identiﬁed as modiﬁable.
Out of these 11 modiﬁable error categories ﬁve were
in direct relation to the medical device and the
other six were considered to be partially/indirectly
related.
Partially modiﬁable error categories. Out of the total
16 error categories ﬁve (31.25%) were identiﬁed as par-
tially modiﬁable. Out of these only two were partially/
indirectly related to the medical device (ventilator) and
the other three were not related at all.
Scenario 3: A physician alters the dose of heparin
delivered through an infusion pump and fails to hit
the conﬁrm button.
 Modiﬁable error categories. Out of the total 31 error
categories 15 (48.4%) were identiﬁed as modiﬁable.
Out of these 15 modiﬁable error categories nine were
in direct relation to the medical device and six were
considered to be partially/indirectly related.
 Partially modiﬁable error categories. Out of the total
31 error categories 14 (45.1%) were identiﬁed as par-
tially modiﬁable. Out of these 14 partially modiﬁable
error categories six were considered to be partially/in-
directly related to the device and eight were consid-
ered to have no relation. Environmental stress from task overload and errors
arising because of changing shifts were considered
to be non-modiﬁable entities with no direct relation
to the medical device; each appeared once in the
responses (6.4%).6. Redesigning the design phase
So far we have captured speciﬁc errors occurring in
critical care scenarios and have qualiﬁed them according
to their modiﬁability and their relationship to the med-
ical device present. Based on the knowledge we gained
about these errors we developed the insight necessary
for making modiﬁcations to the medical device design
cycle, such as the inclusion of pointers to the designers
on how to consider the prospective setting for the de-
vice, involved human factors, and probable error situa-
tions. The ultimate objective is to use the cycle for the
production of a well-conceived device prototype.
Before we suggest modiﬁcations to the device design
cycle, we have to understand the concept of design
and development planning as stipulated by the FDA.
‘‘Design Control Guidance for Medical Device Manu-
facturers,’’ published by the FDA in 1997, sets out qual-
ity assurance practices to be used for the design of
medical devices. By design controls they refer to an
interrelated set of practices and procedures that should
be incorporated into the design and development pro-
cess, i.e., a system of checks and balances. The design
controls are meant to assist the manufacturers in under-
standing quality system requirements and to ensure that
they address the intended use of the device based on the
needs of the user and the patient. Given that the cost to
correct design errors is lower when errors are detected
early in the design and development process [42], the sig-
niﬁcance of design control and the importance of a solid
design foundation cannot be overstated.
Fig. 6 shows a generic medical device design cycle that
is based on industrial product development cycles and the
waterfall design process constructed by the Medical De-
vices BureauofHealth inCanada [18].Reviewandvalida-
tion occur at almost every step of the process. Design
input (or requirements) is an important starting point
for the device designers, and essentially implies that
requirements are given to the designers by stakeholders
and information obtained by the evaluation of existing
devices (for which improvements are forthcoming). The
device designers translate the requirements and eventu-
ally generate a prototype. The prototype has to undergo
a number of evaluations, including ﬁeld-testing, before
it is accepted as a ﬁnal product. Human–computer engi-
neering factors and other usability issues are all part of
the design process and are continuously included and im-
proved upon during the cyclic evaluations.
Fig. 6. Traditional medical device development cycle. Financial
factors are not being considered part of the cycle for this study.
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of usability issues in the actual setting mainly lie in the
ﬁeld-testing portion of the cycle. In our study, we ob-
served errors in the critical care setting, their modiﬁabil-
ity, and their relationship to the medical device involved.
Drawing from those errors, we realize how important it
is to consider various factors in the health care setting to
achieve optimum patient safety. To bring in this next le-
vel of safety into the device design, we need to supple-
ment the requirements presented by the stakeholders
by adding the new health care setting inputs to the de-
sign cycle. These additional inputs, termed Situational
or System research, can be divided into the following
categories.
6.1. Users of the system
Humans have a limited functional spectrum beyond
which the caution, vigilance, attention, and memory of
a person fail. No one can be a perfect worker at all times
or in all situations. Doctors and nurses are the primary
users of medical devices in healthcare. Looking at the re-
sults, we see that human factors contribute to a large
number of errors and most of these are modiﬁable to
a limited extent. Bringing user-related errors under the
extended device safety net would primarily include use
of cognitive artifacts, aﬀordances, and external represen-
tations [43]. Cognitive artifacts are human-made materi-
als, devices, and systems that extend peoples abilities inperceiving objects, encoding and retrieving information
from memory, and problem solving (Gillan and Schva-
neveldt [44]).
Based on the error categories, the situational research
pertaining to users of the system can be split into the fol-
lowing subcategories:
 Number of users. Healthcare is an excellent example
of collaborative cognition [5]. Execution of a single
task may involve complex interactions and commu-
nication among many users. As the number of indi-
viduals and the intermediary interactions increase,
the likelihood of loss or transmutation of informa-
tion increases [23]. Apart from numbers, variation
in the expertise hierarchy can further this informa-
tion loss. Prompts, reconﬁrmations, and alerts are
built into devices to safeguard against this informa-
tion loss, but having a uniform set of such features
is not practical. Norman [45] argues that well-de-
signed artifacts could reduce the need for users to
remember large amounts of information, whereas
poorly designed artifacts increase the knowledge
demands on users and the burden on their working
memory. A balance needs to be struck so that these
features match the setting. Research on the type
and range of users possible for the prospective set-
ting of the device needs to be completed and then
translated into appropriate aﬀordances and external
representations.
 User authorization. Error categories that point at
inappropriate users of the device were found in the
scenario concerned with the ventilator machine (Sce-
nario 2) as well as the one with the heparin infusion
pump (Scenario 3). Authorization to make changes
in device settings is an important issue in the health
care setting where multiple users as well as non-users
(visitors, family members) exist. Unqualiﬁed,
untrained users attempting to change device settings
can lead to catastrophic events. Controlled authoriza-
tion and secure operation of a device can be achieved
with the use of locks and constraints, which need to
be built in at critical locations. Due consideration
should be given to workﬂow issues as emphasized in
the previous paragraph.
6.2. Policies and protocols of the system
A standard set of policies and protocols, although
desirable, is not always possible. The tricky thing
about policies is that they are frequently updated
and changed. Our modiﬁcations to the design cycle
started with the users and now extend to their speciﬁc
interactions and the policies that govern them. Based
on the error categories, the following subcategories
can be used:
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ten vs. verbal) of patient care orders were held
responsible for errors in the provided scenarios. Stan-
dardization of practices at the institutional level could
curtail incidents related to these variations. Building
on the partial relationship of these errors to the med-
ical device, designers could include features that allow
the inclusion of logic, conversion, and alerts pertain-
ing to orders into the device. Again this requires
research on the range of policies that are followed
in health care settings.
 Inservicing, labeling, and installation protocols.
Knowledge about these factors is necessary to pro-
vide aﬀordances or built in reminders (regarding
device maintenance) that will ensure smooth mainte-
nance and operability of the device.6.3. Administration and setup
Judging from the analysis of the scenarios, the impor-
tance of appropriate accessibility of a device and its dis-
play and sounding alerts is appreciated. Geographic andFig. 7. Medical device development cycle with consideration of additional f
niche. The additional segment of Situational Research has been included w
administration and setup of the system. Apart from these speciﬁc device req
found and included in the design. Contents in the dashed boxes are the subconceptual research of the workﬂow in diﬀerent scales of
health institutions needs to be carried out. Lack of edu-
cation and training about the device was another error
category that presented quite often. Apart from the ini-
tial in-servicing and training provided about the device
during its installation, there needs to be a mechanism
to maintain the continuity of the training, since its users
represent a dynamic population that will change all the
time. Multiple approaches can be carried out by the pro-
vision of intuitive displays, external references, inbuilt
training sessions, etc. Again these can only be conceived
after adequate research about the users, the administra-
tion, and the policies of the system where the device is to
be placed.
The modiﬁed version of the device design cycle is de-
picted in Fig. 7. Situational research generates addi-
tional and more speciﬁc requirements for the device
that are not as explicit or obvious as the initial input re-
quired for designing the device. Device engineers follow
most of these situational research-generated require-
ments at one stage of the design cycle or the other. Many
of these requirements are only appreciated after ﬁeldactors and inputs in order to extend safety features beyond the device
hich generates knowledge pertaining to the users, policies, protocols,
uirements which were not part of the initial requirements can also be
divisions of the entities touched upon by the situational research.
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idea behind formalizing the approach is to work on this
situational information in the beginning of the device
design and come up with a better prototype earlier on.
Acquiring information about the users, the administra-
tion, and the policies that permeate a system is but
one task, and the translation of these into useful features
of the device is another; the ultimate goal being a safety
net that goes beyond the physical margins of the device.7. Conclusion
In the traditional sense Creation is meant to be an
unbounded, unrestrained, and unguided process. Medi-
cal device design is a creative process, but the end prod-
uct has such a potentially grave impact on human life
that it cannot be allowed to evolve in an unguided fash-
ion. Market competition, rapid phasing out of devices,
and the changing of technology utilized all contribute
to the race towards creating newer and better devices.
Poorly conceived prototypes are worked upon only to
meet compliance standards, and the essence of making
the perfect device gets lost in the imposed urgency of
moving the device from the drawing board to the shelf.
The purpose of understanding the prospective settings
of device operation and the potential errors faced is to
utilize the information in building a better and safer pro-
totype. The designers play an active role in preventing or
at least curtailing the eﬀects of a medical error by build-
ing patient safe equipment. A device design cycle
emphasizing the above mentioned situational, adminis-
trative, and human factors would act as a guide for
the designer to achieve these desired results.Acknowledgments
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A.1. Scenario one: nitroglycerine
In the ICU, a patients condition was deteriorating
and multiple therapeutic interventions were being
made at the same time. As part of this situation, ﬁve
medication changes needed to be made immediately
in order to reverse the patients condition. The nurse,
receiving voice orders, was programming the infusion
pump to administer one dose of nitroglycerine at
10 cm3/h, and mcq/kg/min doses of four other medica-tions. The patient experienced serious decrease in
blood pressure a short while later as a result. Biomed-
ical engineering stated that the pump was operating
adequately yet noted that the dose of nitroglycerine
programmed in was 10 mg/kg/min; they also noted
that positioning of the pump in the patients room
was awkward and not easily accessible from the front
due to other critical care equipment being in the way.
The attending physician stated that the intended dos-
age was clearly written in the record as being
10 cm3/h.
A.2. Scenario two: oxygen
A pediatric ICU physician was treating a six-month-
old patient with oxygen and ordered that the infant re-
ceive 1.5 L/min. Within 3 min, the patient became hyp-
oxic. At this point, the critical care team increased
oxygen ﬂow to 3 L/min for 10 min to compensate and
was then ordered by the physician to be set to 2 L/
min. Biomedical engineering told the critical care team
that they set the ﬂow control knob between 1 and 2 L/
min not realizing that the scale numbers represented dis-
crete settings (0 or 1 or 2 or 3 etc.) rather than continu-
ous settings (1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, etc.). Hence, even though
the knob rotated smoothly—suggesting that intermedi-
ate settings were possible—there was no oxygen ﬂow be-
tween the settings.
A.3. Scenario three: heparin
Around 8 pm, a patient was receiving a usual infu-
sion of heparin per the heparin protocol, around
12 cm3/min (1200 U/h). Due to a change in circum-
stances, this patient was to receive a bolus dose of Hep-
arin IV through the infusion pump. This bolus was
ordered to change at the end of one hour back to the
maintenance continuous dose. A physician at the end
of the hour changed the drip rate but did not check
the conﬁrm button or notice the small conﬁrm print
warning on the panel of the pump. The next morning,
a nurse entered the room upon hearing the pump alarm
beeping. She noted an empty bag, and that the rate set
on the pump was 200 cm3/min. The patient had re-
ceived a bolus of approximately 18,000 U of heparin.
When the nurse manager investigated the event, both
nurses who were caring for this patient overnight de-
nied changing the pump infusion at all. Of note, there
was a patients family member in the room the entire
night, though this person was never asked directly
about what might have happened to the pump. Fur-
thermore, the patient did not recall anyone changing
the pump. Biomedical Engineering now has the case,
and is investigating the pump. Preliminary report sug-
gests that there was no problem with the pump but that
it was misprogrammed.
Table 1
Final error categories, speciﬁc errors, involved individuals with respect to their modiﬁability and relation to the medical devices in the scenarios
Error category Error identiﬁed Individual identiﬁed Modiﬁablity Relation
to device
Administration Education and training System/administrators Partial No
Administration Device choice ICU administrator Yes Partial
Administration Education and training on device System/administrators/clinical care team Partial Partial
Administration Device removal ICU administrator Yes Partial
Administration Inservicing Vendor Yes Partial
Device Device design: inbuilt constraints/checks Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: lack of logic for unit conversion Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: standardized input Device designers/administrators Yes Yes
Device Device design: generic Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: inbuilt alarms, indicators for no ﬂow Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: availability of continuous settings Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: interface Device designers Yes Yes
Policy Device access by appropriate user Respiratory therapist Yes Partial
Device Device design: visual display/interface Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: louder alarm Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: inbuilt alarm trigger Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: programming/instant alarm Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: alarm location/wrong setting Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: poor interface Device designers Yes Yes
Device Device design: poor visibility/ﬂow display Device designers Yes Yes
Situation Environmental stress/task overload Medical team No No
Policy Double checking Medical team and physician Partial No
Policy Double checking and documentation System/Administrators Partial No
Policy Lack of standards/protocols System/administrators Yes Partial
Policy Order format: implementation protocol System/administrators Yes Partial
Policy Order format: mode Physician Yes Partial
Policy Order format: standardization System/protocol Yes Partial
Policy Order format: units Physician Yes Partial
Policy Streamline work ﬂow, clear orders System protocols Partial No
Policy Order format: delivery Physician Yes Partial
Policy Inservicing Biomedical Engineer Yes Partial
Policy Miscommunication Biomedical engineer and critical care tea Partial No
Policy Labeling and inservicing System/administrators Yes Partial
Policy Protocol for actions System/administrators Yes No
Policy Changing shifts: new users System/administrators No No
Policy Inservicing and device evaluation Biomedical engineers Yes Partial
User User error: generic Medical team Partial No
User User error: carelessness Nurse Partial No
User User error: mislabeling pump Nurse Partial Partial
User User error: order interpretation Nurse Partial No
User User error: inattention Device operator Partial Partial
User User error: bad use of device Device operator Partial Partial
User User error: deviation from protocol Medical team Partial No
User User error: inappropriate user Device operator Yes Partial
User User error: action Nurse Partial Partial
User User error: lack of Knowledge Nurse Partial No
User User error: documentation of changes Physician Partial No
User User error: automatic habit, previous experience on pum Physician Partial Partial
User User error: alarm beeping not checked Nurse Partial Partial
User User error: failure to monitor patient Nurse Partial No
User User error: action (conﬁrm button) Physician Partial Partial
Setup Environment/ﬂoor setup/design improvement ICU administrator Partial Partial
Setup Environment/ICU setup: device positioning ICU administrator Yes Partial
Setup Proximity to beeping device Nurse Yes Partial
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Table 2
Nitroglycerine scenario, responses in which partial modiﬁable error categories/factors were identiﬁed
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Player identiﬁed Direct relation to device
Education and training System/administrators No
User error: generic Medical team No
User error: carelessness Nurse No
User error: mislabeling pump Nurse Partial
User error: order interpretation Nurse No
User error: bad use of device Device operator Partial
User error: lack of knowledge Medical Team No
Double checking Medical team and physician No
Double checking and documentation System/administrators No
Streamline work ﬂow, clear orders System protocols No
Miscommunication Biomedical engineer and critical care team No
Environment/ﬂoor setup/design improvement ICU administrator Partial
Table 5
Oxygen scenario—responses in which partial modiﬁable error categories/factors were identiﬁed
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Player identiﬁed Direct relation to device
Education and training on device System/administrators/clinical care team Partial
User error: generic Medical team No
User error: lack of knowledge Medical team No
Double checking Medical team and physician No
Miscommunication Biomedical engineer and critical care team No
Table 4
Nitorglycerine scenario—responses in which no modiﬁable error categories/factors were identiﬁed
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Player identiﬁed Direct relation to device
Environmental Stress/task overload Medical team No
Table 3
Nitroglycerine scenario—responses in which modiﬁable error categories/factors were identiﬁed
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Player identiﬁed Direct relation to device
Device choice ICU administrator Partial
Device design: inbuilt constraints/checks Device designers Yes
Device design: lack of logic for unit conversion Device designers Yes
Device design: programming standardized input Device designers/administrators Yes
Device design: standardized input Device designers Yes
Device design: generic Device designers Yes
Lack of standards/protocols System/administrators Partial
Order format: implementation protocol System/administrators Partial
Order format: mode Physician Partial
Order format: standardization System/protocol Partial
Order format: units Physician Partial
Order format: delivery Physician Partial
Environment/ICU setup: device positioning ICU administrator Partial
Table 6
Oxygen scenario—responses in which modiﬁable error categories/factors were identiﬁed
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Player identiﬁed Direct relation to device
Device choice ICU administrator Partial
Device removal ICU administrator Partial
Device design: generic Device designers Yes
Device design: inbuilt alarms, indicators for no ﬂow Device designers Yes
Device design: availability of continuous settings Device designers Yes
Device design: interface Device designers Yes
Device design: appropriate user access Device designers Yes
User error: inappropriate user Device operator Partial
Order format: delivery Physician Partial
Inservicing Biomedical engineer Partial
Labeling and inservicing System/administrators Partial
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Table 8
Heparin scenario—responses in which modiﬁable error categories/factors were identiﬁed
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Player identiﬁed Direct relation to device
Device design: standardized input Device designers Yes
Device design: interface Device designers Yes
Device access by appropriate user Respiratory therapist Partial
Device design: visual display/interface Device designers Yes
Device design: louder alarm Device designers Yes
Device design: inbuilt alarm trigger Device designers Yes
Device design: programming/instant alarm Device designers Yes
Device design: appropriate user access Device designers Yes
Device design: alarm location/wrong setting Device designers Yes
Device design: poor visibility/ﬂow display Device designers Yes
User error: inappropriate user Device operator Partial
Lack of standards/protocols System/administrators Partial
Order format: delivery Physician Partial
Inservicing and device evaluation Biomedical engineers Partial
Proximity to beeping device Nurse Partial
Table 7
Heparin scenario—responses in which partially- modiﬁable error categories/factors identiﬁed
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Player identiﬁed Relation to device
Education and training on device System/administrators/clinical care team Partial
User error: generic Medical team No
User error: carelessness Nurse No
User error: inattention Device operator Partial
User error: bad use of device Device operator Partial
User error: deviation from protocol Medical team No
User error: action Nurse Partial
User error: lack of knowledge Medical Team No
User error: documentation of changes Physician No
User error: automatic habit, previous experience on pump Physician Partial
User error: alarm beeping not checked Nurse Partial
User error: failure to monitor patient Nurse No
Double checking Medical Team and Physician No
Miscommunication Biomedical engineer and critical care team No
Table 9
Heparin scenario—responses in which no modiﬁable error categories/factors were identiﬁed
Error identiﬁed (broad category) Player identiﬁed Direct relation to device
Changing shifts: new users System/administrators No
Environmental stress/task overload Medical team No
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